

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

The Total Force: Are We There Yet?
The Naval Reserve in Operation Allied Force

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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16 May 2000

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DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4
20000914 047

8
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED				
2. Security Classification Authority:				
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:				
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.				
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT				
6. Office Symbol: C	7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207			
8. Title (Include Security Classification): The Total Force: Are We There Yet? The Naval Reserve in Operation Allied Force (u)				
9. Personal Authors: CAPT Donald L. Roy, USNR				
10. Type of Report: FINAL	11. Date of Report: 16 May 2000			
12. Page Count: 24	12A Paper Advisor (if any):			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.				
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Naval Reserve Reservist Operation Allied Force Kosovo Alert Order, Warning Order PSRC CINC augmentee Total Force				
15. Abstract: Operation Allied Force was a vivid example of how the Active and Reserve Components of the Navy, as well as the other Services, train, operate, and fight as a single entity. In numerous commands throughout the Fleet, Reservists are an integral part of the command in peacetime and an indispensable part of the command in wartime. When Commanders needed augmentation for operations in Kosovo, however, the current process of obtaining IA and Reservists was so slow that most people did not arrive until the fighting was almost over. The delays in obtaining Reservists was due primarily to the unwillingness of OSD to request a PSRC until all Services had decided upon their needs and the time required for the President to ensure he had adequate public support for the mission. Despite the slowness of this process, Reservists did help significantly by volunteering to come immediately using ADT and AT. Even with the great number of volunteers, however, there were operational costs involved with not having all the right people with the right skills available in a timely fashion. To rectify this, the Navy should increase the FTS Reserve presence on all major staffs. Additionally, when a Warning order is issued, CINCs should immediately assess their need for Reservists and include a request for the number of Reservists needed to complete crisis action planning and to execute each potential COA. CJCS should then immediately seek a PSRC; when they issue the Alert and Execute orders, they should include authority to recall the appropriate number of Reservists.				
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract: Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users		
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED				
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT				
19. Telephone: 841-6461	20. Office Symbol: C			

In the National Military Strategy of 1997, General Shalikashvili described the strategic environment as one with "a number of uncertainties, including potentially serious threats to America's security. Principal among these are regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats, and 'wild cards.'"¹ One could say that Operation Allied Force exemplified all of the challenges described by the Chairman. Like many military conflicts, it was one that did not culminate as quickly as the original planners had anticipated. When it became apparent that the war would be protracted, sustainment became an issue and the regional Commander in Chief (CINC) looked to the Reserve Component for assistance. Although Reservists were trained and ready to join the fight, the recall and mobilization process was very slow. In the case of the Naval Reserve, those who were mobilized by Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) did not arrive into the Theater until almost seven weeks after hostilities had commenced. That being the case, we are faced with two significant questions. First, was there an operational cost of the delay? Secondly, does the CINC need a faster process to access Reservists?

As we investigate these questions, we will first look at a short history of the Total Force concept. Next, we will summarize some of the significant planning events during Operation Allied Force and analyze how Reservists were identified and mobilized for the war. Lastly, we will identify problems and make recommendations concerning the activation of Reservists for future contingency operations. Reservists recalled for Allied Force came from the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Naval Reserve. Because of the differences in organizational structure and the differences in how the services use their Reserve Component, this discussion will be limited to the use of Naval Reservists. Within the Naval Reserve, personnel can be placed into two categories: those in commissioned units such as ships and aircraft squadrons, and those in augment units that have no equipment. Augment units provide

personnel to existing active Navy commands and represent about 65% of the Naval Reserve Force, or about 50,000 people. Although portions could apply to both categories, this discussion will also be limited to Naval Reservists assigned to augment units.

Although first published in 1970, the Navy's Total Force policy was actually shaped into reality during the 1980's. Its stated purpose then was to integrate both the Active and Reserve Components "into a single force capable of responding decisively to short-notice regional conflicts."² During that time period, the Naval Reserve trained and prepared to augment the Active Component in case of a major conflict. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were the consummate test for this policy and the Reserves responded well and performed admirably.

Since Desert Storm, however, the concept of the Total Force Policy has changed. The reduction of force structure through the 1990's did not include a corresponding reduction in operational commitments, causing Navy manpower to be stretched to the limit. As a result, the Total Force Policy now states that the "Navy will employ Reserve forces and personnel to relieve the stress on Active Operating Tempo and Personnel Tempo."³ It also states that Reservists will be fully integrated and capable of responding "to the entire spectrum of requirements, including war or national emergency, contingency operations, military operations other than war (MOOTW), Peacetime Contributory Support (PCS), humanitarian operations, full or partial mobilization (including pre and/or post mobilization) and as such other times as the national security may require."⁴ The shift means that most Reservists, rather than drilling in isolation on Drill Weekends preparing for a major regional conflict, now work day in and day out, along side their Active Duty counterparts and, in many places, have become an indispensable part of the command. This was the case even in many overseas commands in 1999 when Operation Allied Force erupted.

Planning for Allied Force began in the summer of 1998. "Planning focused on air strikes and diplomacy as the primary tools to achieve U.S. and NATO objectives."⁵ The original concept of operations was that the war would last three to four days. Planners at that time were certain that NATO would not allow the bombing to continue for longer than a week at the very most. In the case of the 6th Fleet Staff, there was initially no thought of calling for Reservists or other augmentation since the forces in place at the commencement of hostilities would easily be able to conduct three to four days of combat operations.⁶ As is well known, of course, the bombing actually lasted for 78 days. After the initial few days, when it became apparent that the war would be relatively protracted, personnel augmentation quickly became an issue. "At the onset of Operation Allied Force, the number of military personnel required by the European Command and Joint Task Forces Noble Anvil and Shining Hope exceeded the numbers of trained personnel on hand."⁷ Although the European Command (EUCOM) quickly realized it needed more people, the current process would not quickly provide them.

The bombing started on 24 March. Rather than recall Reservists, the 6th Fleet staff originally received augmentation from 2nd Fleet since, again, it was thought that the war would last less than a week. Even then, the 2nd Fleet augmentees did not arrive until 17 April – two and a half weeks after the request. Throughout the Theater, the Individual Augmentation Process was used, which is designed to assign active duty personnel from different commands, on a Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) basis, to the supported CINC. The process, however, "is not designed for rapid response."⁸ Since EUCOM needed people quickly, they did not initially follow the established procedure, but even the modified process "at times resulted in delays and created dual taskings to the Services."⁹ As one would expect, there was a definite impact on the supporting CINC's. "The need to flesh out key staff positions in the units assigned to Operation

Allied Force imposed a sudden and unanticipated requirement for roughly 1,000 additional personnel...Because the numbers of such personnel are already limited, many of these positions had to be filled by drawing personnel from other active units. Use of this so-called 'rip to fill' mode meant that the active unit providing the augmentee was left without its required complement of skilled personnel.¹⁰ Therefore, not only was the process slow, but it also left the supporting commands undermanned in several key areas.

If the active duty augmentation process resulted in delays, the process of recalling Reservists was not any faster. By the first of April, 6th Fleet was asking for Reserve support. Requests for Reservists were sent via the normal process, described later, and on 10 April, OPNAV determined that the Navy requirement for Allied Force was 892 Reservists. Although the Navy wanted to ask the President for a PSRC, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) would not forward a request to the President without a request from all the Services, and the Air Force, at that time, did not want to recall its Reservists.¹¹ It was not until after EUCOM and the National Command Authority (NCA) determined that Allied Force would be a protracted air campaign, that the Air Force wanted to request a PSRC. OSD then forwarded the request to the President, who signed the PSRC on 27 April. The overall timeline is shown in Appendix A.

The first Naval Reservists recalled under the PSRC arrived in Theater in mid-May – seven weeks after hostilities had commenced. Throughout the course of the conflict, Naval Reservists served in 19 different commands and came from seven general specialties (see Appendices B & C). The largest request for Reservists was COMFAIRMED with 320 augmentees, followed by 6th Fleet with 82. Immediately following hostilities, KFOR requested 83 Seabees for the follow-on humanitarian operations. Not every billet that was requested was actually filled, but by the end of the operations, 92 percent of Navy's Joint Individual

Augmentation requirements had been filled, using both Reservists and active duty on TAD.¹²

While the number that the Navy was allowed to recall from the PSRC was 892, the largest number of Reservists on active duty from the PSRC before the bombing stopped was only 201. Due to the follow-on humanitarian operations, the PSRC continued through the summer and the highest number serving on active duty was 478, which occurred on 12 August.

To understand why it took so long for the CINC to receive Reserve support, we must investigate the process of obtaining a PSRC. As mentioned earlier, planners did not originally anticipate the need for Reservists. As early as February, EUCOM did ask for 257 Individual Augmentees (IA) due to imminent combat operations. Those billets, however, were filled by the active duty IA process. When the JTF Commander and the 6th Fleet Commander did identify a need for Reservists, those requests were sent to the Navy Component Commander, CINCUSNAVEUR. CINCUSNAVEUR then forwarded the request to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff, in turn, sent it to the Service planners to validate the requests. If a request was not considered valid, it was sent back to the CINC, either for further justification or cancellation.¹³ In the Navy's case, not every billet requested was validated by N3 and, as mentioned earlier, on 10 April, the OPNAV staff validated 892 billets and forwarded the validation to the Joint Staff.

Although the validation process took time, there were two other main factors which caused the delay in obtaining a PSRC. The first delay was simply the time it took to decide whether Operation Allied Force would be a land or an air campaign. If it was to be a land campaign, then segments of the Army Reserve Component would have to be activated. If it was to be an air campaign, the Air Force would need its Reservists. The Navy, which needed some of its Reservists regardless of the type of campaign, would have to wait until the course of action had been decided upon and approved before it could get its Reservists. That decision process

took about three weeks. The second delay came from the political leaders. In addition to activating its Reservists, if it was to be an air campaign, the Air Force planned to invoke "stop loss." This meant that enlistments would continue indefinitely and retirements would be placed on hold until after the conflict was over. Politically, a "stop loss" is considered even more significant than activating Reservists. Before doing either one of these, the political leadership wanted to ensure that public support of the campaign was significant enough to support what could very well be perceived as drastic action.¹⁴ It was not until 27 April that the President felt he had the public support to both sign a PSRC and authorize the Air Force to invoke "stop loss." The end result was that while some PSRC activated Reservists arrived in mid-May, most arrived as the hostilities were ending. In the case of 6th Fleet, Reservists who arrived due to the PSRC "mostly did After Action Reports."¹⁵

Although the PSRC activated Reservists extremely late in the campaign, many non-PSRC activated Reservists were actually serving in place when hostilities commenced and many more arrived well before the PSRC was signed. Anticipating combat operations in mid-March, 6th Fleet asked for volunteers. Six Reservists arrived almost immediately to augment the Battle Watch Team aboard the flag ship, U.S.S. LaSalle. More Reservists came later, giving the command constant augmentation, in a variety of functions throughout the conflict.¹⁶ COMFAIRMED used Reservists to reinforce their Forward Logistics Sites from 3 to 35 people, initially with volunteers and later, with PSRC personnel. In the Intelligence community, many Reservists quickly volunteered to augment Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Molesworth as well as 6th Fleet and CINUSNAVEUR. In the case of JAC Molesworth, the active duty IA process took up to 40 days to produce assistance and was so unwieldy that some thought it actually hindered

mission effectiveness. The PSRC process was not any faster. Calling for Reserve volunteers, on the other hand, produced an operational, all-Reserve intelligence cell in 72 hours.¹⁷

If the PSRC was not in effect until 27 April, how did Navy commands obtain Reserve support so quickly? As mentioned earlier, Reservists routinely serve alongside their active duty counterparts in normal daily operations and exercises. Reservists serve with their active duty commands on Annual Training (AT) which is 12 to 14 days per year. Additionally, CINC's have been allocated money to bring Reservists on active duty for Additional Duty for Training (ADT). If Reservists are available, the CINC can use ADT money at his discretion to bring them on active duty for various periods of time. In the 6th Fleet augment unit for example, each person in the unit averages 58 days a year on active duty in support of 6th Fleet.¹⁸ While the number of days on active duty certainly varies between individual Reservists and their gaining commands, the norm is well above the minimum one weekend a month and two weeks a year.¹⁹

Rather than wait for a Presidential Recall, then, commands throughout the European Theater quickly asked for volunteers either when hostilities seemed imminent or after they had commenced. It is important to note at this point that the term "volunteer" is used loosely here to differentiate between those who served before and after the Presidential Recall. After the PSRC was signed, 97% of the billets were filled by volunteers, meaning, of course, that only 3% were recalled involuntarily.²⁰ If the CINC and JTF Commanders received the assistance they requested for Operation Allied Force, and almost everyone who served actually volunteered to serve, does it matter whether a Reservist is serving on ADT or due to a PSRC? Is this of any concern to an Operational Commander or is it purely an administrative matter? The answer to these questions is that although, overall, the results were positive for Allied Force, this difference can, and in this case, did have some operational impact for the JTF and Theater Commander.

The operational impact of the existing PSRC process can occur in two significant areas. First, a CINC cannot know which of his requirements will actually be filled when he simply issues a request for volunteers. "A warfighting CINC should not have to depend on the willingness and availability of Reservists to voluntarily fill gaps in manpower during contingencies." (emphasis in original)²¹ Although Reservists have traditionally answered the call very enthusiastically, one cannot reliably conduct crisis action planning when there is no guarantee that the forces required for execution will be there. "Volunteerism does have its drawbacks. One is that volunteers can *un-volunteer* themselves – usually at the last hour. Army National Guard officials had to find replacement volunteers for a number of soldiers who dropped out just prior to a six month deployment to the Sinai."²² It is not very difficult to envision a scenario when the CINC asks for volunteers and, due to a variety of circumstances, receives little response. Fortunately, this was certainly not the case in Kosovo.

During Allied Force, it was the initial volunteers serving on AT and ADT who provided the critical support needed for a successful operation. In COMFAIRMED, waiting for a PSRC would have had a significant operational impact. One staff officer commented that "without the Naval Reserve, the USN would have been relegated to spectator status after the [Tomahawk Land Attack Missile] shoots. To logically support a [Carrier Battle Group] and [an Amphibious Ready Group] during the lead up periods, the 75 days of shooting, and the backload/humanitarian ops, our logistics assets and command and control structure were tasked to the breaking point...the steady flow of AT and a good supply of ADT held us over until the PSRC personnel began checking in about 60 days into the shooting. I needed them about 30 or more days before that."²³ Reservists serving aboard the U.S.S. LaSalle were also on AT or ADT, working 12 hours a day analyzing intelligence. Without them, intelligence analysis aboard the

Flag ship would have been severely hampered.²⁴ Joint Analysis Center Molesworth, where 65% of their augmentees were Naval Reservists, stated emphatically in one report: "Bottom line on Operation Allied Force: The JAC could not have performed its mission without Reserve support!"²⁵

Besides hindering reliable crisis action planning, another operational cost of relying on volunteers is that of not receiving properly trained personnel. When a call for volunteers is issued, the gaining command does not always receive either the Reservists who have trained with them or those with equivalent skills. For Operation Allied Force, there was an actual cost incurred due to this problem. Although one could certainly argue that the actual operational cost in this case was minor, it may not always be true in future operations. Again, at COMFAIRMED, augmentation did arrive quickly, but it took "about three weeks before folks were up to speed."²⁶ Remarks a COMFAIRMED staff officer: "The latency in PSRC call-up cost us money and efficiency since we had to move a lot of people around. I would say that not having the right ordnance available was a big operational cost, and probably second to that was the lack of command and control over what was coming over."²⁷ Similarly, a staff officer from 6th Fleet commented that "the best guys were those who trained with the unit. We got bodies with the proper rating, but not always with the proper training."²⁸ The point that these two officers are making is that with a PSRC call-up, the CINC can get the people who have trained with the unit and, therefore, are ready to contribute upon arrival. Volunteerism, on the other hand, provides the CINC people with the proper rating, but not necessarily the proper skill or training.

In addition to receiving augmentees without appropriate training, there were also Reservists with needed skills who were not called upon. Operation Sustain Hope, the follow-on humanitarian operation after Allied Force, demonstrated one untapped area. Sustain Hope was a

“sustainment operation conducted largely by military forces”²⁹ during which many problems arose. One problem was that “competition for resources led to a perception on the part of non-governmental relief organizations that insufficient attention was given to the humanitarian operation.”³⁰ Additionally, “coordination between U.S. Government agencies was somewhat rough at the beginning of the operation. As a result of this initial shaky coordination, things that could have improved the humanitarian operation were sometimes overlooked.”³¹ As a lesson learned from Sustain Hope, DOD plans to “explore such activities as exchanging liaison officers and conducting humanitarian assistance training exercises.”³² The untapped resource in this case is the Reserve’s Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (NEPLO) program where hundreds of Reserve officers are already trained in this area. While the program is centered domestically, around each State’s emergency preparedness program, these officers have the exact training in humanitarian assistance and emergency agency coordination that was lacking in Operation Sustain Hope.

While NEPLO’s were an untapped resource, other skills were tapped by mere chance. A Reservist who volunteered to serve aboard the U.S.S. LaSalle as a Battle Watch Captain soon became a targeteer when the Commander of 6th Fleet learned of his civilian skill. As part of his civilian occupation, this Reservist had studied the effectiveness of Tomahawk missiles against hardened targets. His knowledge of weaponeering in this area made him a much more valuable asset in the targeting cell than as a watch stander. Also on the flag ship, another Reservist who came aboard as part of the Battle Watch Team was quickly reassigned. In her civilian occupation, this officer was in charge of the Automated Data Processing (ADP) systems for the Center for Disease Control. When the Commander learned of her skills, he assigned her the task of designing an improved ADP system for intelligence analysis aboard the flag ship.³³ Other

examples abound, but the lesson here is that the CINCs and CINC planners are often unaware of skills and capabilities that their own Reservists can bring to the fight. Even though, in many cases, these are skills obtained from the Reservist's civilian occupation, they are documented and can be identified within the Naval Reserve system.

To solve these problems, I offer two recommendations. First, increase full time Reserve presence on all major staffs. Second, the National Command Authority (NCA) should give the CINCs approval to recall a limited number of Reservists as part of the Alert and Execute Orders.

While all major staffs have Full Time Support (FTS) Reservists onboard, their presence should be increased. Most staffs currently have at least one Training and Administration of the Reserves (TAR) officer assigned as a Reserve Liaison Officer (RLO). Usually, this is an O5 billet. Due to the reality of the current Navy manning levels, these officers are normally assigned additional duties, inhibiting their ability to research the needs of their own constituents and match those needs with capabilities that exist within the Naval Reserve. Additionally, since these are O5 billets, Reserve representation can be somewhat diluted in organizations where, typically, all Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACOS) are O6's. Some staffs, such as CINCPACFLT, COMNAVAIRPAC, and COMNAVAIRLANT have RLO's at the O6 level. On those staffs, the RLO has more influence both with the Commander and with the other ACOS's. Additionally, these O6's generally have a TAR staff of one or more O5's and some senior enlisted personnel. Between having a TAR staff and having more seniority, these RLO's are in a better position to ensure that planners are aware of existing Reserve capabilities. They are also in a better position to ensure that Reserve requirements are included early in the planning process for both deliberate planning and crisis action planning. Additionally, these TAR staffs are in a better position to

locate individual Reservists with skill sets, often acquired in their civilian employment, who can meet specific, critical needs of the CINC.

While increasing Reserve presence on major staffs would enhance the planning phase of an operation, granting the CINCs early access to their Reservists would greatly enhance the execution phase. Today's Total Force Policy is essentially documentation that our current force structure is not even adequate for effective peacetime operations. "During peacetime, Navy will employ Reserve forces and personnel to relieve the stress on Active Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO)."³⁴ If active duty force structure is not adequate for peacetime operations, it certainly is not adequate for the greatly increased workload associated with crises and contingency operations. DOD has recognized this for several years now. In 1994, the Defense Department asked Congress to give the Secretary of Defense authority "to call-up 25,000 Selected Reserve members for contingencies and operations other than war."³⁵ Congress failed to act on that request, but the point here is that due to our present force structure, the CINC needs access to Reservists as soon as crisis action planning is underway. The CINC also needs to know with certainty what forces will be available to him if and when an execute order is issued.

Given that only the President is authorized to recall Reservists, one way to expedite the process is to include PSRC authorization in the Alert and Execute orders. Naval Reservists who augment Navy commands within a CINC's area of responsibility (AOR) should be considered apportioned forces, "assumed to be available for deliberate planning,"³⁶ and should be able to be recalled quickly for crisis action planning. When a warning order is issued, the CINC directs his planners to develop various courses of action (COA). Each alternate course of action should include an input from the component commanders regarding the number of Reservists needed for

successful planning and execution of each COA. These requirements should be in two phases: the first would be the number required to complete crisis action planning and force preparation. That number would normally be small – enough to augment intelligence cells and planning staffs if necessary. The second phase would be the number required upon receipt of an Execute order. The CINC should then communicate the requirements to the CJCS, along with the Commander's Estimate and the recommended COA. The CINC should specify the number of Reservists from each Service requested by each of his component commanders. The Chairman would then advise the NCA and request authorization to recall the appropriate number of Reservists both for the crisis action planning phase and for execution of the selected COA. It is imperative that the Chairman *not* wait for unanimity among the Services before requesting the recall. As in the case of Allied Force, one Service may need Reserve augmentation regardless of the COA selected, while the other Services might not need any augmentation at all. When an Alert order is issued along with the selected COA, authorization to recall the appropriate number of Reservists to complete the crisis action planning and force preparation must also be included. If an Execute order is then given, that order would include authorization to recall the number of Reservists required to execute the COA.

By initiating a PSCR during the initial planning stages, we can ensure that the CINC's plans pass the tests of adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability. "Adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission."³⁷ As the Commanding Officer of JAC Molesworth stated so emphatically, many commands simply cannot accomplish a wartime mission without Reserve support. Identifying the requirements up front would ensure that sufficient augmentation is requested to get the job done. Making it a PSRC, as opposed to relying on pure volunteerism, would ensure that the

CINC is not placed "in a dilemma where Reserves that are required for implementing a CINC's plan may not be called, even though the CINC is held responsible for accomplishing his mission."³⁸

In addition to passing the test of adequacy, an early PSRC would ensure that plans pass the test of feasibility. "Feasible plans accomplish assigned tasks with resources that are available within the time frames contemplated by the plan."³⁹ Both the IA process and the PSRC process as they presently exist do not allow the CINC to develop feasible plans since they do not receive the guaranteed augmentation they need within the contemplated time frame. If the CINC were authorized to recall Reservists as part of the Alert and Execute Orders, he would know when his augmentees would arrive and would be certain that they would arrive in time to contribute to mission accomplishment.

The third test that a CINC's plan must pass is that of acceptability. "Acceptable plans are proportional and worth the anticipated cost."⁴⁰ The main cost in this case is the political cost of recalling Reservists. Where the NCA might be reluctant to authorize a recall of tens of thousands of Reservists, recalling small numbers carries significantly less political consequence. Although recalling 20,000 Reservists for Desert Shield and Desert Storm was a very significant event, the President has authorized much smaller PSRCs on other occasions with little attention from the American public. In September 1994, the President signed a PSRC for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti that included 400 Reservists for the Navy. In December 1995, he signed another PSRC that included 220 Naval Reservists for Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia.⁴¹ The American public paid little attention to these recalls and the reaction from the Reservists has actually been positive. "The recent use of Reserve component units in and around Bosnia called for a deployment of up to 270 days. The Reserve components have indicated that

there has not been any negative impact on their readiness because of the increased use of the Reserve units. Some of the Reserve units have indicated a positive impact on their respective units. There is no statistical data to indicate any trend that Reservists are 'voting with their feet' as a result of being mobilized."⁴² This should come as no surprise since, as mentioned earlier, 97% of the Navy PSRC billets for Allied Force were filled by volunteers. Recalling Reservists early in the process, then, would ensure that, despite our limited force structure, the CINC's plans would satisfy all the principles of Joint Operational Planning.


In summary, one can truly say that the Total Force is a reality. Operation Allied Force was a vivid example of how the Active and Reserve Components of the Navy, as well as the other Services, train, operate, and fight as a single entity. In numerous commands throughout the Fleet, Reservists are an integral part of the command in peacetime and an indispensable part of the command in wartime. When Commanders needed augmentation for operations in Kosovo, however, the current process of obtaining IA and Reservists was so slow that most people did not arrive until the fighting was almost over. The delays in obtaining Reservists was due primarily to two factors. First was the unwillingness of OSD to request a PSRC until all Services had decided upon their needs. Second was the time required for the President to ensure he had adequate public support for the mission. Despite the slowness of this process, Reservists did help significantly by volunteering to come immediately using ADT and AT. Even with the great number of volunteers, however, there were operational costs involved with not having all the right people with the right skills available in a timely fashion.

To rectify this, the Navy should increase the FTS Reserve presence on all major staffs. Additionally, the PSRC process should be greatly expedited. When a Warning order is issued, CINCs should immediately assess their need for Reservists and include a request for the number

of Reservists needed to complete crisis action planning and to execute each potential COA. CJCS should then immediately seek a PSRC; when they issue the Alert and Execute orders, they should include authority to recall the appropriate number of Reservists. Recalling Reservists early in the planning process would ensure that, despite our limited force structure, the CINC's plans would pass the tests of adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability. The Total Force concept, which started out as mere words in 1970, is a stark reality today. Naval Reservists play a vital role today in accomplishing routine peacetime operations. They must be made available quickly for the critical role they also play in wartime.



Kosovo IA Timeline




Timeline for Operation Allied Force Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up.⁴³

Appendix A



PSRC/TAD Snapshot

as of 21 July 99




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Number of Naval Reservists Requested for PSRC.⁴⁴
Box indicate number of Reservists requested by various commands.

Appendix B



Demanded Skill Groups



Appendix C

Endnotes

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington: 1997), 1.

² Navy Department, Total Force Policy, OPNAVINST 1001.21A (Washington: 1994), 1.

³ Navy Department, Total Force Policy, OPNAVINST 1001.21B (Washington: 1998), 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵ Department of Defense, Kosovo / Operation Allied Force After-Action Report (Washington: 2000), 15.

⁶ LCDR Joseph Leonard, Naval War College Student, interview by author, 13 April 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes. LCDR Leonard was 6th Fleet N313 (Tomahawk Planner) in 1998 and 1999.

⁷ Department of Defense, Kosovo / Operation Allied Force After-Action Report (Washington: 2000), 109.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 112.

¹¹ LCDR Millie Wears, CNO N0951M, telephone interview by author, 14 April 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes.

¹² Chief of Naval Operations (N095), After Action Review: Operation Noble Anvil (Washington: 1999), 15.

¹³ CDR Richard Page, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs, telephone interview by author, 12 April 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ LCDR Joseph Leonard, Naval War College Student, interview by author, 13 April 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes. LCDR Leonard was 6th Fleet N313 (Tomahawk Planner) in 1998 and 1999.

¹⁶ CAPT Ken Hamilton, Deputy N3, Sixth Fleet, telephone interview by author, 1 May 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes.

¹⁷ LCDR Wayne Porter, JAC Molesworth Reserve Liaison Officer, telephone interview by author, 26 April 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes.

¹⁸ CAPT Edward Massey, Commanding Officer, Naval Reserve Navy Command Center 106, telephone interview by author, 15 April 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes. CAPT Massey was the Commanding Officer of Naval Reserve Commander Sixth Fleet Detachment 802 during Operation Allied Force.

¹⁹ Department of Defense, Reserve Component Programs: March 1998 report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington: 1998), xxiii.

²⁰ LCDR Millie Wears, CNO N0951M, telephone interview by author, 14 April 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes.

²¹ USEUCOM Joint Analysis Center, Issues Briefed to Mr. Money By JAC/DP 28 Sep 99 (London: 1999), 3.

²² Major Markus Pfaler, The CINC and the Citizen-Soldier: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenge (Naval War College: 1997), 8.

²³ CDR Michael Martin <martinm@naples.navy.mil> "USNR Support." 17 April 2000. Personal e-mail. (17 April 2000).

²⁴ CAPT Ken Hamilton, Deputy N3, Sixth Fleet, telephone interview by author, 1 May 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes.

²⁵ USEUCOM Joint Analysis Center, JAC Reserve Brief (Operation Allied Force and Beyond) (London: 1999), 6,15.

²⁶ CDR Michael Martin <martinm@naples.navy.mil> "USNR Support." 25 April 2000. Personal e-mail. (25 April 2000).

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ LCDR Joseph Leonard, Naval War College Student, interview by author, 13 April 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes. LCDR Leonard was 6th Fleet N313 (Tomahawk Planner) in 1998 and 1999.

²⁹ Department of Defense, Kosovo / Operation Allied Force After-Action Report (Washington: 2000), 104.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, 105.

³² *Ibid.*, 136.

³³ CAPT Ken Hamilton, Deputy N3, Sixth Fleet, telephone interview by author, 1 May 2000, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., author's notes.

³⁴ Navy Department, Total Force Policy, OPNAVINST 1001.21B (Washington: 1998), 2.

³⁵ Charles E. Heller, Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 43.

³⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Joint Pub 5-0) (Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1995), I-13.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ LTC Wayne R. Pembroke, Give the CINCs the Authority for Selected Reserve Call-up, (Naval War College: 1992), 2.

³⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Joint Pub 5-0) (Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1995), I-13.

⁴⁰ Ibid., I-14.

⁴¹ Chief of Naval Operations (N095), Navy's Total Force (Washington: 1999), 10.

⁴² Department of Defense, Reserve Component Programs: March 1998 report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Washington: 1998), xxiv.

⁴³ Chief of Naval Operations (N095), After Action Review: Operation Noble Anvil (Washington: 1999), 3.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 8.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 13.

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